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BOOK REVIEWS
STAR WORMWOOD, by Curtis Bok. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1959, 228
pages. Price: $3.95.
Roger Haike killed Angela Hake and ate part of her. In vengeance society killed and ate Roger Haike. That was over a quarter of a century ago, but
the case is timeless. Judge Bok protests it. The author of Backbone of the
Herring (1941) and I, Too, Nicodemus (1946) brings us a story that is horrifying in every respect. But we are told that we shouldn't be shocked, for it is,
outside of its grisly details, a common one.
The tale is neither long nor complex. Roger Haike was seventeen and
hungry that depression winter. In more than one sense he had been hungry
all his life. He had lost his father as a child; his mother deserted him. Raised
by an aunt, Roger had neither companionship, unselfish affection, intelligence,
talent, hope nor enough food. The death of the aunt left him with less than
he had before; now he lacked a home. A job wasn't to be had by a boy when
men stood in bread lines. To stoke a furnace and eat from garbage cans or to
consume an occasional trapped rabbit was the breadth and depth of his
existence.
His only friend, a boy named Joe Hake, had withdrawn from him. This
boy and his sister had become incestuously involved, and Joe's sexual betrayal
of Angela led her to seek revenge where she could. Catching Roger in the
act of roasting a rabbit in the furnace, Angela threatened to tell on him. In a
panic of fear at losing his last hold on security, Roger seized and killed the girl.
Reacting to the realization of the need to dispose of the body, he tried to force
her into the blazing fire. The body fell back. Roger touched cooked flesh and,
driven now by nothing but hunger, he ate part of his victim. Then he got sick
and fled.
That was the crime of Roger Haike. What Judge Bok treats as society's
crime followed inexorably. Arrested, the youth was charged with murder,
rape and violating a dead body, although the prosecutor called it "cannibalism." Here were the elements of an auto da f6. The young attorney who came
forward to defend the boy was helpless against the indictment, a biased judge,
a remorseless prosecutor, an aroused public and the best jury the circumstances
would allow. Of course the defense was insanity. The defense could make no
useful issue of the rape, which had in fact been Joe's act. The verdict was
guilty of murder. Roger Haike went to the chair.
[76]
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That is the story, but the author gives us much more than those bare bones,
'though one is left wondering whether he has given enough. Be that as it may,
this is a novel of protest, a breed which one might say is much too rare. Particularly it is rare in the law, where modernly we are given the over-rated psychological novels of Cozzens, or the delightful light weightedness of Henry Cecil.
Judge Bok has a lot of protest in this little book, and he has chosen to make
it in an unusual way. He separates the novel from the comment. There are
three chapters, "The Crime," "The Trial" and "The Execution," each followed
by a section entitled "Comment," in which the author vents his controlled indignation. The mechanism is one which might be adopted by the unpractised novelist, which Judge Bok really is, but in this case it comes from the origin of the
book as a series of William H. White -lectures at the University of Virginia
Law School in 1957. The novel merely exemplifies the lectures.
Although this review is intended eventually to jump away from Star
Wormwood itself and say something about one of the issues it raises, it should
be said that this is a difficult little book. The difficulty is that more issues are
raised than could possibly be more than barely recited. To begin, there is the
character of the judge who, when he was assigned to preside, announced "that
he would sit day and night to bring the young miscreant to book." Then he
hastily issued a rider in the next edition that of course the defendant's legal
rights would be scrupulously protected. What it meant was that Judge Parkinsen intended to murder him. Judge Bok says:
There is a Judge Parkinsen in every legal community, a man of outward
judicial demeanor but with a head full of sawdust and the soul of a man-eating
shark. The community gets him because it deserves him: the ablest lawyers
cannot be bothered to accept judicial duty, and the method of selecting judges
is predominantly political.
Just after setting forth the crime (which, by the way, one gathers is a

true or very nearly true one), Judge Bok tells us that we should
... not be shocked by the idea that man can eat his fellow. . . . It is sublimated reverently into profound religious experience in our Church Communion ....
Daily we eat our neighbors in spirit or in mind, by cruelty and
domination and the crushing jaws of an imperious will.
Let us not be so squeamish about the violence of the body when we are
so very intolerant of the violence of the mind.
As for Roger we are told that he wasn't guilty of rape, he didn't commit a
murder (at least not first degree murder), and he was guilty of an old common
law misdemeanor, whicn should have been excused in the circumstances. Roger
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was a victim of vengeance which is the public's "process . . . to pursue and
catch and flay, and it is the old story of man's inhumanity to man." Asserting
that the penology of the future will not be punishment but individual treatment,
Judge Bok writes: "Someday we will look back upon our criminal and penal
process with the same horrified wonder as we now look back upon the Spanish
Inquisition." One is left to wonder at the full meaning of this statement.
To Judge Bok fact and fairness are worth talking about, not "those great
but slippery words" Truth and Justice. He shows us in detail his reasons why:
the capitalized shibboleths don't get us anywhere. We can't know truth. Justice, if it is more than a word, gets to become a system and codified; and it
leads to thinking of reform in the law having to have a logic to it. Through
it all sight is lost of the likes of Roger Haike. The honest aims are fact finding
and fairness.
In "The Trial" we get a picture of unrelieved grimness, conveying effectively the futility of fighting to save Roger. It is the longest chapter in the
book because the author has tried to show the whole of the short trial. He
takes the reader through every step from voir dire to the act of sentencing. As
for the psychiatric witnesses we are to understand the inanity of trial practice in
the use of the expert witness. We hear the presiding judge nudge the jury from
bias to conviction with the technically correct words delivered with a tone
which would never show on the record. We read the summation of Roger's
counsel, an appeal to the sense and sensitivity of the jury, to their compassion
and understanding, and we know it had an impression. But then we read the
prosecution's summation and we see that in the circumstances an appeal to the
Right cannot prevail against the representative of society's own Evil.
What does all of this mean to us? It means, according to the commentary, that the trial, "the hub of the legal wheel," is ". . . the weakest part of
the system." It is no better than the men who use it. The court is good
theater, but that is about the extent of its good side. Lest there be any misunderstanding, the problem is not one of efficiency. It is deeper than that.
"The criminal law is the black sheep of the legal family." Where lies the
answer? In the growth of the Welfare State and psychiatry. If any one
factor in this many splendored book can be said to be the theme, this is it.
But the reviewer confesses that he can't quite see the precise force of the Welfare State except in the broad sense of the ever increasing interest of the State
in the affairs of the individual. Even for one who is in fundamental agreement
with Judge Bok's politics it is difficult to grasp his meaning in the present context. Perhaps it would have been better for him to assert that the modern trend
is toward analytical technique at all levels. In any event the author makes clear
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what he expects of psychiatry in a treatment of the medical-legal conflict which
rages about the M'Naghten Rule, and he believes psychiatry must win.
Roger Haike was executed, but only after being subjected to the torture
of waiting for the outcome of a hopeless appeal and of seeing the two men in
the death house before him go to their fate, leaving him to stare at the black
door behind which he would die. Says the author:
I protest this dreadful case.
Punitive penology has failed utterly. Society could have made better use of
Roger Haike than turning him into fertilizer. Its vengeance does not save
souls, restore minds, or mend consciences.
He pleads for recognizing a "mighty difference between a man's first and
second offenses." He talks some about the causes of crime, listing our vindictive penal system as one. He has something to say about juvenile delinquency.
He examines briefly our reasons for punishing. He attacks the fact, the theory
and the basis of capital punishment and the life sentence. He discusses the
most recent developments in penology: parole administration, the trend toward
specialized types of penal institutions in each jurisdiction, and the recognition
of training and guidance in penology. He devotes several pages to the famous
California Institution for Men at Chino, where there are no bars and the aim is
rehabilitation. Finally he ends by asking for a change in the public ideas and
acceptances which underlie criminal law.
Note that Star Wormwood is but 228 pages long. If this review has
made anything apparent, it is that there is crowded into a little space a very
great number of ideas, opinions and comments. The author says that "our
vindictive penal system" is "the thing this book is written to attack." In the
process many other things fall under the knife. The trouble with the book lies
right there. So many things are criticized that the focus is pretty well lost.
This reviewer thinks Judge Bok chose the wrong fact situation for his purposes. The story of Roger Haike is all wrong from the beginning of that humble life to the vengeance wreaked by society. Everything is wrong. Any commentator has to criticize a great many facets of it, and in so doing the focus
is lost. By losing the focus the commentator loses the power to make his comments very meaningful. Of course Judge Bok means to call to the attention
of the lay public the breadth of error and misunderstanding in our criminal
law, but calling that attention cannot be very helpful without going beyond
mere exposition or protest.
The sad fact seems to be to this reviewer that Judge Bok has said very
little that is new. His criticisms are too many, his discussions too brief, his
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suggestions for reform too vague, his treatment of the problems raised too
broad, to be of much value in his own crusade. Even the major points-for
instance, expert witnesses, the trial process, insanity, capital punishment, penal
reform-are too big to be treated meaningfully in such a short compass. In
short, it is hard to say that Star Wormwood adds much to the discussion of the
issues, big or small.
Particularly disappointing to the reviewer was the matter of the trial itself.
After all if, as the author says, we must talk, not of Truth and Justice, but of
fact and fairness, we will be talking about the trial stage or its preliminaries;
and he does say that trial is the weakest part of the system. One looks in
vain for much development of this proposition, except the following:
We must consider, in the nearer future, the effect of the new conception
of penology on the adversary form of trial.
Trial by combat of wit is now reckoned the law's most potent method of
establishing truth....
The same energy (the criminal defendant] now exerts in trial he would

exert, under a new system, in improving himself and shortening his period of
detention. Any restriction of liberty will arouse some opposition, but if the
restriction is beneficial his initial opposition should be no greater than making
sure that the need for treatemnt is fairly and clearly shown.

The fact that the adversary trial is the best the law has achieved thus far
is no reason for thinking that nothing better is possible. The adversary trial
and M'Naghten should both die on the vine as penology discards vengeance
and adopts effective methods of rehabilitation.
Let the Courts go on finding deeds. There is much to do to cleanse and
sharpen this process. Put the doctors, the soicologists, the psychologists, and
the psychiatrists in the prisons to determine by all available scientific means
how long a man should stay there. (Pp. 145-146. Emphasis added.)
The quoted passage is typical. The reader waits for something more than
long range objectives to surge through the indignation. Certainly if the trial
is what we've now got, and if that is the weakest part, it deserves closer examination. It will be the unusual reader who will not get the impression that
what was fundamentally wrong in the story of Roger Haike was the process
by which his conviction was obtained.
It is doubtful that very many people in the United States have even the
vaguest idea of how criminal justice works in other countries. Judge Bok's
conclusion that the adversary trial is the best may be true, but it isn't certain or
obvious. We know it failed utterly in the case of State v. Roger Haike. We
can say that the failure was inherent, not in our penal theory particularly, but in
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the mode of trial itself. This fact would seem to point to the possible desirability of reform at this very point. In reading the book it occurred to the
reviewer that some comparison with other modes of criminal procedure would
be worthwhile, and it is to that subject the excursive part of this review is directed. Please bear in mind that the aim here is not to argue the merits of one
system against another but to provide some information.

EUROPEAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

For the most part the French system will be under examination, with
some material on the German system to the extent that it is different from the
French, and a comment on the Soviet system. Only the trial and matters preliminary to it are considered. First, note should be taken of another fairly recent book about criminal procedure, this one by Dr. Glanville Williams, entitled The Proof of Guilt, which, like everything he has touched, is an excellent
piece of work. His aim was to "try to decide whether [the rules of English
criminal procedure] promote the conviction of the guilty and the acquittal of
the innocent, and so justify the esteem in which the British system of trial is
quite generally held." He points out that there are six features of Common
Law criminal trials which stand out to foreign observers:
1. The position of the judge as an umpire;
The defendant's freedom from being questioned;
3. The mode of examination of witnesses by question and answer;
2.

4. The formal rules of evidence;
5. Trial by jury; and
6. The function of the magistrate.
Let no one jump to the conclusion that because these six points are common to both the English and our systems, the systems are precisely alike, for
Williams is perfectly correct-if too smug-in saying that in general the
differences between them come down to
good administration-not only the aloofness, impartiality and efficiency of the
judge, but the detachment and fairness of prosecuting counsel, the restraint of
defending counsel, and the care taken by the police to preserve good public
relations, which in itself involves respect for the rights of suspected persons.
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Therein lies a whale of a difference from what is too commonly the American
scene. These are things Judge Bok might have said, although in fairness one
must say that he has in his other books.
Dr. Williams reminds us that our notion of justice, i.e., fairness, to the
accused is recent, that jury trial in its origins had a built-in bias against the
defendant, and that only after several centuries of development did it come
about that a separate body from that which made the charge passed on the
guilt. Not until the 16th century could the defendant call witnesses, and even
then they were not permitted the oath. Rules of evidence are fairly new;
hearsay and character evidence have not always been excluded. Permitting a
defendant counsel and the right to cross-examine are a bare two hundred
years old. The history of criminal justice under the Common Law is, indeed,
a "sombre picture." Still by the 1700's Voltaire was able to admire the English system when compared with the French, which seemed devoted to destroying the accused. Matters have reached the point today where the public's main
criticism is not conviction of the innocent, which of course still happens, but
acquittal of the guilty.
On the continent the early Romano-canonical system was accusatory, pitting wronged against wrongdoer, the judge playing the role of umpire. In the
12th Century this was abandoned in favor of an inquisitorial system where the
judge carried the burden of deciding the case in secret on the basis of documents.
The Teutonic influence was accusatory with compurgation or the ordeal. In
the Holy Roman Empire methods were accusatory or inquisitorial, secret and
documentary, presided over by a judge and laymen who divided responsibility
for law and fact, with the judge responsible for drawing out the facts.' The
accusatory principle eventually dropped out, but trial in secret on the basis of
documents lasted into the 19th Century, which also brought the creation of a
body of officials charged with prosecuting criminals. The principle end result of this development is that striking characteristic of Continental procedure:
the function of the judge.
Dr. Williams has said that this is the single identifying mark of the
inquisitorial system, but this involves us in a semantic difficulty. Frequently
ours is called the adversary system as opposed to the inquisitorial. On this
basis it appears on the surface as though there is a clear demarcation. On the
one hand, the function of the prosecution is to bring to book a miscreant, to
1 See, Auld, The Comparative Jurisprudence of Criminal Procedure, 1 TORONTO L. J. 82, at
86-90 (1935). Note also the Star Chamber of the Tudor-Stuart Era and the occasional appearance
of such characters as Hanging Judge Jeffries.
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obtain a conviction by building a case that convinces; on the other, the function
of the prosecution is to make it possible for the court to draw out the facts of
the matter at hand. But in this terminology there is really a distinction without
a difference. So long as the function of the defense is to use all legitimate
means to gain an acquittal, the system must necessarily be adversary. So it is
more useful to talk of the accusatory method, where the prosecution makes
and tries to prove a charge and the defense tries to refute the charge, and the
inquisitorial method, where the function of the judge to elicit the facts by his
own means is superior to the function of counsel. The trouble here is that by
these terms there is no true inquisitorial system anywhere now, if there ever
was, but only accusatory and mixed accusatory-inquisitorial ones. The term
inquisitorial, then, must be understood to identify that form where the judge
functions independently, more or less, of the parties.'
Continental criminal procedure is grounded in statute, that is, in the
various codes, rather than in custom, as a great part of ours is. The procedure
has been analyzed as having certain characteristics (or principles), some of
which are shared with ours. One is that of official prosecution. Once initiated,
a prosecution is entirely in the hands of the state. The accusatory principle
means that all proceedings are initiated by the prosecution. Court investigation, independent of trial, is another characteristic. Also, the state is bound
to prosecute whenever an offense has occurred. In court the proceedings must
be oral. Criminal justice has an immediacy about it. Trials are public. On
trial there is equality of rights, but in the preliminary stage the State is privileged. Finally, one must note the breadth of evidence and the informality of
proof.3
In France there are three stages in criminal procedure, all of which can
be judicial, as we shall see. There is preliminary investigation, the determination of whether to prosecute and the charge, and the trial. Also, there are
three classifications of offense. The lowest is contraventions, which we would
call misdemeanors; next d~lits, comprising the higher misdemeanors and lesser
felonies; and, finally, crimes, the serious feloines. The procedure in each is
different, as of course is the punishment, so classification is important. Contraventions go directly to trial before what amounts to a justice of the peace, the
Tribunal de Simple Police. The prosecution can take a d~lit directly to the Tribunal Correctionel, where trial is without a jury. With crimes the procedure
is considerably more complicated. Any crime must be reported by the Parquet
(the body of prosecuting officials) to the juge d'instruction. This official in
theory conducts the entire investigation and decides whether an offense has been
Williams, Proof of Guilt, 28.
3 Auld, op. cit. supra, note 1, analyses these principles at some length.
2
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committed, and whether it is in fact a crime or a d~lit. He then reports his
finding back to the prosecution. In the case of a dlit the prosecution may then
take it to the Tribunal Correctionel. If the jiuge d'instruction decides there
should be a prosecution for crime, his decision is reviewed by a special court
called Chambre de Mises en Accusation, which must finally approve the prosecution.
If that approval is forthcoming, the trial is held in the Cour d'Assises,
which is composed of three judges and seven laymen. The judge has before
him the dossier prepared by the juge d'instruction,and on the basis of that he
will conduct the case, unimpeded for the most part by the prosecution or the
defense. It is the judge who asks all the questions, calls the witnesses and
examines the accused, who cannot refuse to take the stand but who can refuse
to answer questions. When the evidence is all in (and evidence here has a very
broad meaning), the prosecutor and the defense address the court, which
4
deliberates as one body on fact and law and penalty.
These are the broad outlines of French criminal procedure, and to an
American used to the contest of wits it must seem very strange. Certainly as
we look at the details the strangeness won't be lessened, but perhaps the rational
element will be emphasized. First, though, a word of history. Earlier the story
of continental procedure was carried up to the French Revolution. That great
event had a marked influence on the criminal law, particularly in that it brought
about a great substitution of much that was English for that which was in the
Ancien Rgime. The principal import was the jury. At any rate it was the
jury system that survived, after the Grand Jury was done away with and
the Justice of the Peace relegated to a minor position. The Code d'Instruction
Criminelle of 1808 reflected a return to much of the Ancien Rggime.' French
criminal procedure remains pretty much as it was established by that enactment.
4 This exposition of Continental criminal procedure is based almost entirely on materials in
English. The most valuable recent articles are: Vouin, The Protection of the Accused In French
Criminal Procedure, 5 INT. & COMP. L. Q. 1, 157 (1956); Devlin, English and French Legal
Methods: Crime, 4 INT. & COMP. L. Q. 376 (1955); Freed, Aspects of French Criminal Procedure,
17 LA. L. REV. 730 (1957). Despite their age the following detailed studies are even more useful
in most respects: Ploscowe, The Investigating Magistrate (Juge d'Instruction) In European Criminal
Procedure, 33 MICH. L. REV. 1010 (1935); Ploscowe, Administration of Criminal Justice in
France, 24 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOL. 712 (1933); Ploscowe, Development of Inquisitorial and
Accusatorial Elements in French Procedure, 23 J. CiuM. L. & CRIMINOL. 372 (1932); Ploscowe,
Jury Trial in France, 29 MINN. L. REV. 376 (1945); Wright, French Criminal Procedure, 44 L. Q.
Rev. 324 (1928); 45 L. Q. REV. 92 (1929); Keedy, Preliminary Investigation of Crime in France,
88 U. OF PA. L. REV. 385, 692, 915 (1940). It should be noted that the more recent articles reflect
the present status of the jury in France. Most of the changes in the law are contained in Dalloz,
Code d'Instruction Criminelle, §§ 251-253, 310-380, 394.

5 See, besides the articles cited in note 4, Ploscowe, The Development of Present-Day Criminal
Procedures in Europe and America, 48 Hiv. L. REV. 433, at 462; for mutual borrowings between
France and England, see, ibid., at 471. See, also Keedy, op. cit., supra, note 4, 385-89.
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The styles of courts have been mentioned, but something should be said
about the members of the prosecuting department, the public ministry charged
with administering the system. The magistrats, as they are called, are regarded
as non-partisan and judicial. Note that the judges are drawn from the same
body as make up the prosecution. So criminal court judges are former public
prosecutors. This sometimes happens in the United States, of course, but it
could never happen in England for the reason that there is no such office.
Cases begin either with a complaint by the victim, by accusation of a third
party or by written report of a police officer. These usually come to the prosecutor, but they can be made directly to the juge d'instruction,who must resort
to the prosecutor for authorization to investigate. The injured party can also
complain directly to the juge d'instruction and ask for a prosecution and for
damages, thus making himself the Partie Civile.6 Now if the charge is one of
crime, the Code requires the prosecutor to deliver it immediately to the juge
d'instruction. Despite this and the principles recited earlier, the procureur, as
the prosecutor is called, has a great measure of discretion at this point. Since
he can take a d~lit to the Tribunal Correctionelwithout first going to the juge
d'instiuction, in the overwhelming majority of cases he will prefer to do so.
Thus the procureur can, by a process called "correctionalization," reduce the
charge from crime to dilit and take it out of the juge d'instruction'sjurisdiction.
So relatively few cases ever come before the latter.7 Hence, the Tribunal Correctionel is the general criminal court, and there is no dossier there (or jury),
thus making it a rigourous court for the defendant. 8
At any rate, though the number is small, the class of major delinquencies
with which we are immediately concerned are funneled through this fellow
we can't recognize, this official who constitutes the really essential difference
between Continental and Anglo-American preliminary criminal procedure.
The juge d'instruction' combines the functions of police, prosecutor, coroner, grand jury, committing magistrate and defense attorney. He is responsible for every phase of the investigation from visiting the scene of the crime
to preferring the "indictment", as we would call it. Acting under the authorization from the public prosecutor, he functions to determine the justifiability
of the accusation and to prepare substantial accusations for trial. His work is
secret from the public and counsel for the accused. Every act he performs
6

Keedy, op. cit. supra, note 4, at 414-419; Ploscowe, Administration of Criminal justice in

France, 24 J. CRIM. L. &

CRIMINOL.

712, at 715.

Ploscowe, ibid., at 716.
8 Ploscowe, op. cit. supra, note 4, 23 J. CGaM. L. & CRIMINOL. 372; Ploscowe, op. cit. supra,
note 4, 33 MICH. L. REv. 1010, at 1012; see, also, Wright, op. cit. supra, note 4.
9 Detailed treatments of his functions are given by Ploscowe, op. cit. supra, note 4, 33 MICH.
L. REv. 1010; Keedy, op. cit. supra, note 4, and Wright, op. cit. supra, note 4.
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is recorded, albeit frequently imperfectly. He must investigate every aspect of
the case to prepare the dossier. He may compel the attendance of witnesses,
secure the testimony of experts, call upon the police to assist him and (though
this runs contrary to theory) delegate some functions. Also, he conducts a
rigorous and, frequently, repeated examination of the accused. Abuse of this
function brought about a reform in 1897 under which at this stage the accused
is permitted advice of counsel.
It has been observed that his utility depends upon his ability to exercise
power solely in the interests of truth. He acts for the court, the prosecution
and the defense. His aim should be not only to build a case but to elicit facts.
Thus the character of the juge is the defendant's only real protection. Lacking
in theory the fire of partisan interest the juge d'instruction insures adequate,
thorough preparation through centralized responsibility, unified control and
direction. By no means is the investigation limited to the accusation, for one
of its functions is to learn enough about the personality of the defendant that
his interests can be protected. His work of necessity is immensely detailed,
and the dossier which he prepares in consequence constitutes a tremendous
pre-trial record, ranging as it does over the whole accusation and the character
of the defendant.1" When the dossier is completed the French juge d'instruction, acting through the procureur, either sends the case to the Tribunal Correctionel (by calling it a delit) or to the Mises en Accusation for approval of
his decision before it is sent on for trial. In Italy the similar official sends
cases directly to trial, and in Germany he merely turns the dossier over to the
court. Of course the decision may be for dismissal, and the procureur can take
issue with it in the Mises en Accusation.
It is hardly surprising that the juge d'instruction idea has borne the brunt
of criticism of Continental procedure. Every commentator notes the incompatibility of one functionary being judge, prosecutor and defense counsel. In
the first place the juge d'instruction himself comes from the prosecutor group.
Second, a completely satisfactory fulfillment of the role would take genius, and
it is well understood that there isn't enough of that to go around. And, as
Ploscowe has commented, he is a holdover from a simpler day when crime and
its detection were somewhat less sophisticated and complex. In short, he's old
fashioned. So he is dependent on the police and delegates his responsibility
to the police." French police are quite as bad as any other. 2 Furthermore,
10 Keedy, op. cit. supra, 692-727, note 4.
11 Ploscowe, op. cit. supra, note 9, at 1031-33; see, also, Vouin, op. cit. supra, note 4, and
Devlin, op. cit. supra, note 4.
12 The extent of delegation by the juge d'instruction and the extra-judicial investigative functions of the police are of concern even to the most sympathetic observer. See, Vouin, op. cit. supra,

13-15, note 4.
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despite the obvious intention of the Code, the procureur is dominant in the
investigation, since the juge's authorization comes from him, the procureurcan
direct him to do some things, and the entire dossier can be examined by the
prosecution at any time, whereas the defendant's right to examine it is limited
to the time of his own interrogation. The prosecutor has a real role in the
preparation of the case. There is, then, a gross inequality between the prosecution and the defense. One of the commentators quotes a French lawyer's
remark in answer to a question about the juge d'instruction: "Oh, he is merely
an assistant to the Procureur."
Reader, pause now and consider this: How is Roger Haike, accused of
murder, rape and "cannibalism" doing under this system?
Assuming the juge d'instruction decides that the offense charged should
go to trial as a crime, and the Mises en Accusation agrees, the case will go to a
Cour d'Assises for trial. Even if the defendant has confessed, which is one
of the aims of the juge d'instruction'sinterrogation, there can be no guilty plea.
The case must go to trial. What we would regard as the proper role of prosecutor and judge are effectually reversed in France. The prosecution does not
call or examine the State's witnesses, cross-examine the defense or bear the
main burden of the case, and he never objects to the evidence. The defense is
limited to protecting the defendant's rights from judicial abuse. Both sides
may suggest questions for the judge to ask. The judge has studied the dossier
for interrogation purposes and may even have examined the defendant ex
camera. Again, the judge has probably once been a prosecutor.
The principle of orality requires that everything in the dossier be said in
court. Witnesses are called and give their evidence in an uninterrupted recitation, which may be followed by questions. This makes practically impossible
any exclusionary rules of evidence, so that what we call gossip or hearsay is a
frequent element in the testimony. The system lacks any attitude for crossexamination. The judge's interrogation is all important, although it is interesting to note that the precise authorization for its use is not agreed upon.' 4 The
defendant cannot refuse to take the stand, although he can refuse to answer
questions. Questions addressed to him are not limited to the accusation, and
evidence of his character and record is always put in. The dossier predominates
at the trial. When the case is ended, the prosecution and the defense make
closing speeches to the court. Before World War II trial in the Cour d'Assises
was before a twelve man jury to whom the judge propounded certain questions
to which its deliberations were limited: Was the crime committed? Did the
13 Ploscowe, op. cit. supra, at 1033, note 9.
14

Ploscowe, Development of Inquisitorial and Accusatorial Elements in French Procedure, 23

J. Cium. L. & CRIMINOL. 372, at 378.
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accused do it? Did he act culpably? Were there extenuating circumstances?
Decision was by majority vote and conviction had to be based on "moral certitude." If the verdict was guilty, the court and jury then deliberated together
on the penalty. This last was found necessary to overcome the jury's reticence
to convict when it lacked faith in the judge's penal ideas. It was also necessary
to deprive the judge of power to comment on the evidence. To be sure there
was always the difficulty of defining the realms of fact and law. During the
Vichy regime the German system of mixed professional and lay courts was
adopted., and today there are on the bench three judges and seven laymen, who
sit as the Cour d'Assise. Fact and penalty are decided by the whole, law by
the judges.
The French criminal trial is marked by coherence of presentation and
elastic rules of evidence. It is a combination of accusatory and inquisitorial
elements. Again the judge fills three roles, and again the whole thing is much
criticized. Judges tend to lack impartiality and frequently act like conviction
is their prime duty.' 5 Stephen criticized the French system as, inconsistent with
the function of the judge as a listener, not an investigator. 6 While that may
represent Common Law prejudice, it is no doubt true that there is a built-in bias
against the. defendant, just as there was at Common Law. As there is said to
be at Common Law, there is a presumption of innocence; but this is nonsense
to a great extent under any system, once the finger of accusation has been firmly
pointed.
There are many areas of borrowing and cross fertilization between the
French and Anglo-American systems, as there are areas of intense disagreement.' Ploscowe has pointed out four specific areas where he thinks-our system
preferable." One weakness is the time wasting absence of the guilty plea. For
another he thinks the prosecution should bear the burden of bringing forth the
evidence. Evidence of past conviction should be withheld until guilt is determined. Finally, he would tighten up the rules of evidence to exclude rumor
and gossip.. For the most part Glanville Williams is in agreement. He is very
sensitive to the built-in bias in the system. Still he would give foreign courts
the best of the argument on a few counts. He believes the defendant should,
as in France, be required to submit to questions, even if he can refuse to answer.
In certain aspects of the treatment of hearsay (aspects not developed in this
review) he prefers the French attitude. On the other hand he prefers the
15 Ploscowe, jury Trial in France, 29 MINN. L. Rav. 376, at 383, gives some startling examples.
He also discusses the Vichy reforms, which were validated after the war.
16 History of Criminal Law 544.
17 Ploscowe, op. cit. supra at 471, note 5.
18 Ploscowe, op. cit. supra at 386-387, note 15.
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German system of courts composed of judges and laymen to either the former
French or English system of judge and jury.
It is not within the scope of this article to go into the question of appellate
procedure. Neither is it necessary to say much about the other Continental
law systems of procedure, all of which are essentially French. Before World
War II the primary difference was in the courts themselves. The German
system reflected the strong tendency of recent times to replace the jury by lay
judges who share the function of detemining fact, law and sentence with the
professional judges with whom they sit.1" This is actually a very old idea to
which the Germans reverted after a brief adoption wholesale of the French
way with all its English importations. One judge disposes of petty offenses,
but more important ones are dealt with by the Schoffengericht, composed of
one judge and two lay judges. Serious crimes come before three judges and
six laymen, in the Schwergericht. This is a simplification, to be sure, but in
the main these three handle criminal matters.2"
As in France the principle of legality prevails, and when a complaint is
made, the prosecution is bound to conduct an investigation and bring a charge
where an offense appears. The other principles cited earlier also apply. In
preliminary proceedings the prosecution is actively in charge at all times,
though where examination under oath is necessary or where witnesses' attention
must be compelled there may be a magisterial inquiry similar to that conducted
by the French juge d'instruction. In fact this inquiry is obligatory in major
crimes unless the accused has confessed to a judge, or the case is uncomplicated,
or the prosecutor decides itunnecessary. In the latter event the accused may
apply himself for such an inquiry. While the investigating judge conducts
the proceedings at his unfettered discretion, the final decision as to whether
to apply for a trial or dismiss the charge is the prosecutor's.
Assuming the prosecutor decides to press the charge, he applies to the
proper court for trial. Another preliminary proceeding is then held by that
court to determine whether a prima facie case exists. If the decision is yes,
the trial takes place; it must not be interrupted for more than 11 days. In
contrast with France, it is the duty of the prosecution to produce the witnesses
and the evidence. The presiding judge is in charge of the proceedings, takes
19

Meyer, German Criminal Procedure: The Position of the Defendant in Court, 41 A. B. A. J.

592 (1955), is a strong defense of the German system as contrasted with our own. The same
criticisms in general have been made of the German as of the French. See, Ploscowe, op. cit. supra
at 463-465, note 5; Exner, Development of the Administration of Criminal Justice in Germany, 24
J. Cium. L. & CRIMINOL. 248, at 253 (1933).

20 Besides the brief Meyer article cited in note 19, see 11 Manual of German Law 138 ff.,
published by the British Foreign Office, which is comprehensive but frequently obscure and seemingly contradictory.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 64

the evidence and examines the accused, as in France, and the rules of evidence
are only slightly more stringent. While the German Code provides that counsel
may examine their own witnesses, this is seldom done. Professional and lay
judges deliberate together; their decision is by majority, except as to certain
statutory questions of culpability and punishment, where a two-thirds majority
is necessary. The resulting judgment includes a written statement of legal
conclusions.
The other Continental systems of criminal procedure depart in no material
respect from the German and French practices, but a word might be said about
the Soviet system, which in style was based on the usual procedure on the
Continent but which represented in theory an abandonment of "the bourgeois
conception of individual rights." 21 Since non-authoritarian systems are fundamentally based, in part at least, on such a conception, the idea of "socialist
legality" can eliminate a substantial portion of the problems those systems face.
For instance if we had the idea of criminal analogy, which says that acts which
are not quite covered' in the statutes, may be treated as crimes when the State's
interests demand, we would have taken a step in an unfamiliar, but in some
sense fruitful, direction. However, perhaps things are not so easy. In any
event for twenty years the Soviets have been recodifying their criminal procedure, and one of the ideas to depart the scene has been criminal analogy.
This would seem to suggest that so long as the State recognizes the need for a
formal and reasonably fair system of criminal justice, there must be a recognition to some degree of "the bourgeois conception."
The hardest question for any system to answer relates directly to Roger
Haike: What is the best way to provide for a system of fact finding that is fair
to him and to the public that the criminal law exists to protect?
GEORGE M. JOSEPH.*

ACQUITTED OF MURDER, by William Seagle. Henry Regnery Co.,
1958, 257 pages. Price: $5.00.
It is the opinion of the author of Acquitted of Murder that far too few
murderers (in fact, far too few criminals of any type) are "getting their lumps"
in American courts. He places the blame upon the judges of the appellate
courts, particularly the Supreme Court of the United States, for their old world
21 Auld, op. cit. supra, 84; Zelitch, Soviet Administration of Criminal Law, is too old to be
very useful. Little has appeared on the subject in English, but Hazard, Soviet Criminal Procedure,
15 TULANE L. REv. 220 (1941) is interesting. Hazard, Soviet Codifiers Release the First Draft,
8 Am. J. Crim. L. 72 (1959), is a review of contemporary thinking and trends.
* B.A., Reed College; J.D., University of Chicago. Assistant Professor of Law, Dickinson
School of Law.
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formalism in the shaping and application of the law of criminal procedure.
This book sets forth and illustrates his argument.
The book is apparently intended to serve as an antidote to the volumes
which have appeared over the past thirty years or so calling attention to instances in which justice has miscarried by convicting innocent persons of crime.
These books, in Mr. Seagle's view, obscure the far more serious problem in
criminal law enforcement-the frequency with which the guilty escape the
punishment befitting their crimes. He is impatient with the "popular sentiment
that it is better for ten guilty persons to escape altogether than for one innocent
person to suffer." While he does not go to the opposite extreme, he does
appear willing to tolerate an occasional conviction of innocent persons, if it is
the only way to assure that ten guilty ones will suffer for their misdeeds. His
principal reason for feeling this way seems to be that "there is a more direct
and continuing danger to society in the acquittal of the guilty than in the conviction of the innocent."
The philosophical controversy, however, is not Mr. Seagle's main concern,
for his position is that the efficiency of criminal law enforcement could be
greatly improved without serious risk of increasing the peril for those (relatively rare) innocents who find themselves in the dock. He does not believe
that the "ten-to-one" maxim is the cause of the problem. Rather, it is a
slogan invoked (perhaps in entire good faith) to justify the results. These
results are attributable to a feeling that the police are a greater menace
to society than the few guilty persons who are acquitted. It may also be
due to the perennial tendency of appellate courts to shape and apply the
law in accordance with an ideal of logical symmetry, without concern for,
or appreciation of, the practical consequences of their decisions. As between these two real causes, he seems to feel that the latter is the one more
frequently controlling.
Mr. Seagle sees a clear line of descent from the procedural formalism of
the 19th Century to the procedural constitutionalism of today. Convictions
in criminal cases are no longer frequently reversed for purely formal errors
in the prosecution of the case. Now, however, convictions are reversed With
increasing frequency for violations of constitutional limitations imposed by
federal and state Bills of Rights and by the 14th Amendment of the Federal
Constitution. It is Mr. Seagle's belief that these reversals on constitutional
grounds are, more often than not, simply formalism in more sophisticated
dress, since the constitutional limitations are spelled out in specific rules which
test the validity of a conviction by a mechanical process. This process takes
no account of whether the error in question was truly prejudicial to the

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

(VOL. 64

accused or whether the guilt of the accused is manifest despite the error.
As he states when speaking of the United States Supreme Court (the chief
source of the new-style formalism), the Justices of the Court,
who no doubt pride themselves on their devotion to substance rather than form
and technicality, . . . would doubtless recoil in horror from any suggestion that
a criminal conviction should be reversed on such a ground as that the name of
the defendant was misspelled in the indictment. . . . But although aware of
the follies of the past, they are blind to those of their own time, and are unable
to perceive that by reversing criminal convictions on constitutional or procedural grounds, irrespective of any question of the defendant's guilt, they
have only substituted the doctrine of constitutional or procedural purity for that
of nonprejudicial error.
The argument of the book is contained in an "Introduction" of twelve
pages and a "Post-Mortem" of sixty-three pages. Between these parts there
are 178 pages of "entertainments"-detailed narrations of the histories of
seven American cases, dating from 1806 to 1939, in which the law went wildly
awry (in Mr. Seagle's opinion) in the handling of prosecutions of manifestly
guilty murderers. I refer to these case histories as "entertainments" because,
although they do serve to illustrate some of Mr. Seagle's contentions, most of
them make the point that the 19th Century courts were guilty of excessive
procedural perfectionism, which, in view of his subsequent argument, is more
or less a flogging of a dead horse.
The "entertainment" feature is understandable, however, in the light of
the fact that the book is probably intended for a popular, rather than a professional audience. It is meant to educate, and agitate, the layman, and it is
well planned and executed for this purpose. The narrations are lively and
colorful. The more formal argument is written in a style which should hold
the attention of an intelligent reader and is featured by careful explanations
of legal terminology and doctrines.
Curiously, though, the author concludes his discussion with the assertion
that the fault he pinpoints can be satisfactorily corrected only by the appellate
court judges themselves. In "the last analysis the problem of curbing the
reversal of criminal convictions to uphold meaningless technicalities is one of
judicial education to induce judicial self-restraint." This strikes me as curious
because it makes me wonder what Mr. Seagle hopes to accomplish through the
publication of this book. If it is an effort to educate the judiciary, its style and
content appear ill-adapted to the purpose. If the intention is to influence the
public, it seems aimed at the wrong audience and is more likely to induce
public contempt for the courts than to stimulate any constructive judicial
education of the sort that Mr. Seagle desires.
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Looking at Acquitted of Murder from the standpoint of one who is a
member of the legal profession but not a specialist in either criminal procedure
or constitutional law, it strikes me that the chief defect of Mr. Seagle's argument is his failure to explore more fully the philosophical question he mentions
at the outset, that is, the question of the relative values of the security of the
community and the liberty of the individual. Although he asserts repeatedly
that the reforms he advocates involve no substantial risk of injustice to innocent
men, he seldom makes much effort to prove that contention or to examine
seriously the arguments on the other side of the issue. There seems to be
implied in each assertion that a rule or practice objected to is of little or no
value for the protection of the innocent, an addendum to the effect: "And
what if it is? You can't bake a cake without breaking eggs." Thus, Mr. Seagle's readiness to sacrifice a few innocent lives in order to assure the conviction
of more of the guilty really does seem to be a key point of his argument. His
failure to more fully examine and justify that value judgment leaves this writer
unsatisfied with his conclusions even though there is force in many of his
specific criticisms.
D. FENTON ADAMS.*
* A.B., Dickinson College; L.L.B., Dickinson School of Law. Professor of Law, Dickinson
School of Law.

